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Abstract 
This paper grew out of my interest in two areas: sports and business. 
Unfortunately, my first love, sports, is now becoming a big business. Major league sports 
are now dependent upon stadiums and the revenue they generate. Unfortunately, these 
stadiums and their "creative" financing packages have serious ramifications on the local 
communities. Due to all the speculation surrounding stadiums and how they are 
financed, I decided to analyze this topic. This project examines the following areas: 
sources of financing, benefits of sports stadiums and sports franchises, and survey results 
from local businesspeople to determine the impact of the Indianapolis Colts on the 
community. This paper is supposed to illustrate the following concept: that sports 
franchises cannot support the costs of stadium construction and public investments in 
these projects cannot be justified. 
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Introduction 
The love affair between the American public and professional sports dates back 
more than 100 years. For years, sports have been a central component of our society. 
They have the unique ability to bring together blacks and whites, young and old. The 
impact sports have had on our lives is unfathomable. Some of people's greatest 
memories are the first time their dad took them to the ballpark, or when their hero led 
their hometown team to a championship. In fact, I can still remember the first time my 
dad took me to see Michael Jordan play, or when we finally saw a game at historic 
Wrigley Field. However, I am not the only that has these feelings. Many people can still 
remember the "shot heard round the world" or when Hank Aaron broke Babe Ruth's 
record. 
Unfortunately, the innocence and joy of watching the Boys of Summer, the 
Monsters of the Midway, and the Kings of the Hardwood has been robbed from us. It is a 
crime that when the time comes for me to take my son to his first game, I will probably 
have to refinance my house. Sports fan and citizens across the country are being held at 
ransom by greedy sports owners. These are individuals who no longer care about the 
game but instead the bottom line. Instead of sports being this magical device that relieves 
us from the stresses of business, sports themselves are now a business. And the machine 
that is running this multi-billion dollar business is sport's stadiums. 
Most of us have been exposed to the travesty of stadium financing. Stadium 
financing is a battle waged between multi-millionaire owners and captive political 
officials. These city officials have no leverage in their negotiations, and are usually at 
risk of not being re-elected if they lose the city's team. Without leverage, these officials 
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are usually forced into situations that involve them offering "sweet" deals to owners. 
These deals usually involve the team paying no rent, receiving all revenue from the 
stadium, along with a subsidy, and then an escape clause so they can leave the now 
financially depressed area in five years for greener pastures. 
The purpose of this paper is to uncover the fallacies that owners and politicians 
have given to citizens over the years. This paper will look at all the issues surrounding 
stadium financing, and reveal the truth on what's really happening. 
v 
The Financing of Sports Arenas: 
The games played off the field 
The Truth Behind Financing 
The battle off the field, the financing of professional stadiums, is one that is being 
constantly waged in our country. It is an important topic because of the large number of 
stadium projects currently being undertaken in our country. During the 1990s, forty-five 
stadiums and arenas were built (www.privatization.org). While that number itself is 
staggering, what is even more astonishing is the amount experts are projecting will be 
spent on stadiums. In the book Sports, Jobs and Taxes, it was predicted that $7 billion 
would be spent on new sports facilities before 2006 (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). 
Now most people would assume that the increase in spending is a good sign. The 
common theory has always been that increased spending is a sign of a strong economy, 
and this is exactly what owners and politicians want us to believe. Unfortunately, our 
economy is in the midst of a downturn, and the groups that are demanding these stadiums 
cannot afford them. The question then becomes: who is paying for all this construction? 
Sports stadiums can be funded in three different ways. The first way is that the 
general public can pay for the stadium. The general public is forced to pay when either a 
new tax is imposed or general fund revenues are used to fund the stadium. The fans or 
users (teams) of the facility might also pay. Fans are forced to pay when stadium 
revenues are used to finance the facility. This occurs through increased ticket, 
concession, and parking prices. The team pays for the stadium when they use the funds 
they receive from revenue sharing, licensing and advertising. While we are all familiar 
with the inflated prices that are charged for apparel, and the large amounts professional 
teams receive through naming rights and sponsorship, these sources are rarely used to 
finance stadiums (www.ncsl.org, 1998). 
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In fact, since 1988, only fifteen new facilities were privately financed. The 
complete list of these facilities, the teams they host, and their costs are as follow: 
Facility Name Team Cost ($millions) 
Fleet Center Celtic sIB ruins $160 
Carolinas Center Panthers nla 
United Center BlackhawkslBulls $180 
The Palace of Auburn Hills Pistons $70 
Bradley Center Bucks $80 
Target Center Timberwolves $113 
Molson Center Canadiens $230 
Madison Square Garden KnickslRangers $200 
Core States Center Flyers/76ers $235 
America West Arena Suns $100 
Rose Garden Arena Trailblazers $260 
Arco Arena Kings $65 
Kiel Center Blues $130 
Delta Center Jazz $78 
GM Place Canucks/Grizzlies $180 
(www.privatization.org) 
While the efforts of these franchises should be applauded, one detail cannot be ignored. 
While these teams did pay for construction, the city or state where they are located still 
provided assistance with the costs by providing roads and other infrastructure. They also 
gave the franchises special tax breaks that are not available to other businesses. 
Targeted beneficiaries are the third option for financing sports stadiums. Targeted 
beneficiaries are those businesses that will experience an increase in business as a result 
of a new stadium. In order for them to finance the project, they are usually charged a 
sales tax that is earmarked to offset the cost of the facility. By doing this it is possible to 
shift some of the burden of the cost onto the businesses that will directly gain 
(www.ncsl.org. 1998). 
While there are multiple avenues used to fund stadium construction, there is 
ultimately only one source. The reason for writing this paper is to educate that source: 
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the general public. Ultimately, it is the tax-paying American that is forced to pay for 
these stadiums, and provide the capital for these bad investments. The majority of 
stadiums are paid for by tax increases earmarked for stadium construction, and by federal 
and state subsidies. Subsidies, however, are also financed through taxes. In fact, during 
the last decade $4 out of every $5 spent on stadiums came from these sources 
(www.privatization.org). 
Before continuing on with our discussion of subsidies it is imperative that we 
cover an issue from the preceding paragraph. That is the issue of taxes. When discussion 
turns to the possibility of using taxes for public projects, the public initially becomes 
upset about the prospect of more of their money going to the government. While this is a 
valid point, other issues must be addressed. 
First, we must discuss the real costs involved. The real cost is not what taxpayers 
are paying in increased taxes. The real cost of taxation is the cost of tax compliance, 
enforcing the tax code and collecting the money. Taxes are simply a transfer of money. 
If this transfer could be easily accomplished then tax revenue could be used to pay for 
stadiums. Unfortunately, though, the cost involved with collecting the tax reduces the 
amount that goes toward the stadium. Along with the costs for compliance are additional 
costs for establishing new tax codes. 
The next issue that must be addressed when discussing taxes is opportunity cost. 
An increase in taxation will directly result in a reduction in consumer consumption. 
Therefore, it is ironic that politicians try to convince us that stadiums will trigger 
economic development when the engine that is used to drive their construction is directly 
~< hindering economic development via reduced consumption (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). 
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The final issue on taxes is equity, or who pays and who derives a benefit. In his 
testimony to the City of New York, Mr. Criscitello, Director of the New York City 
Independent Budget Office, had the following comment on the issue. He said, "Heavy 
use of city funds for stadium construction would raise issues of equity since city 
taxpayers would subsidize the stadium, but relatively wealthier fans from the suburbs 
would share in the benefit." (www.ibo.nyc.ny.us. 1998) 
In 1989, the annual public subsidy on twenty-one sports stadiums that cost an 
average of $50 million to build was $150 million. While that figure accounts for 
subsidies for construction, other subsidies are used just to make teams competitive 
(www.bizjournals.comlhoustonl. 1996). Currently, the average subsidy to keep a team 
competitive costs host cities over $10 million a year. These numbers are astonishing, 
considering they coincide with a persistent push to cut federal costs by eliminating social 
and economic programs. This means that while subsidies are dying off in areas such as 
education and welfare, they are thriving for multi-millionaire owners 
(www.bizjournals.comlhoustonl. 1996). 
If stadiums are such a bad move economically, and lead to increased taxes, then 
why do communities continually keep approving their construction? They continue to 
approve them because of two phrases that owners and politicians like to throw around: 
'job growth" and "economic development." 
Economic Development 
The truth is, except for a few cases, new stadiums do not spur economic 
development. This statement is concurred in testimony by Douglas A. Criscitello to the 
New York City Council, 
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"Research on stadiums consistently finds that there is no basis for forecasting an 
economic development impact beyond that generated by the local expenditures of 
the team and its fans. In particular, none of the studies suggest any economic 
rational for assuming that building any new stadium would itself spur 
construction of office towers and hotels." (www.ibo.nyc.ny.us. 1998) 
If stadiums really have such a minimal impact like Mr. Criscitello reported, then why do 
we build them? We build them because politicians and owners try to persuade us with 
these alleged benefits: 
~ A sports facility generates the creation of new jobs and brings new money into the 
community. Also, people attending the game spend money at the stadium and 
while they are traveling to and from the stadium. 
~ A sports facility and a sports team will make the city a "major league" city, which 
will earn them free publicity and attract new business. 
~ Also, tax and lease payments from the team will offset the subsidies used to build 
the stadium and therefore render the construction a good investment (Noll 1997). 
The impact that politicians and owners attribute to stadiums is moderate if any at all. 
The reason this impact is overstated is because of fallacies that are reported when 
individuals are promoting stadiums. (Just ask the citizens of Cincinnati.) The following 
is a list of reasons of why impact is misreported: 
~ Proponents often confuse spending that is diverted from other local sources as 
spending caused by the stadium 
~ They attribute all spending by out-of-town visitors to the sports team regardless of 
the reason for their visit 
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>- They overstate the multiplier by ignoring crucial characteristics of sports spending 
>- They apply this inflated multiplier to gross spending, rather than local value 
added 
>- They omit the negative effects from the taxation that's used to finance 
construction and the operating deficits of the facility (Noll and Zimbalist, 496, 
1997) 
Job Growth 
In order for a stadium to generate jobs, three factors must be satisfied. First, 
employment levels for the job that will be created must be very low. If employment is 
already at capacity then new jobs do not need to be created. Also, the level of 
unemployment in industries associated with the stadium must be considered. Teams will 
employ janitors, food workers and security personnel. A new stadium will not employ 
professionals like accountants and engineers. 
The second factor to consider is where do people receiving money from the 
stadium live. The people who usually benefit from the stadium are players and owners, 
and these individuals usually do not live in the same municipality as the stadium. 
Therefore, this increase in income that is generated by using tax dollars is leaving the 
community and not generating growth. In Indianapolis's case, the two highest paid Colts, 
team owner lim Irsay and running back Edgerrin lames, live in Carmel and South 
Florida. 
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helped economic development. In addition, other projects would have been privately 
financed not publicly. In essence, construction workers are paying themselves. This 
occurs because a percentage of their income is consumed by taxes, which pay for the 
stadiums. The final argument against this theory is that even if construction workers are 
unemployed it is cheaper to pay unemployment insurance, or pay them to do public 
works jobs. 
The next topic that must be addressed is where this additional income is going. 
When building a stadium that is replacing an existing structure, the incremental change in 
revenue goes directly to the players. Since this paper is focused more to the interests of 
Indiana taxpayers, we will take a closer look at where Colts' players live and spend their 
money. The following is a list of players and where they live. (As of 10/8/02) 
Player Place of Residence Player Place of Residence 
Brock Huard Washington Larry Triplett California 
Cory Sauter Minnesota Tarik Glenn Indianapolis, IN 
Mike Vanderjagt Toronto Raheem Brock Pennsylvania 
Hunter Smith Indianapolis, IN Joe Davenport Arkansas 
Peyton Manning Indianapolis, IN Marcus Pollard Indianapolis, IN 
Walt Harris Illinois Quadry Ismail Florida 
James Mungro Pennsylvania Drew Haddad Indianapolis, IN 
Nick Harper Georgia Mike Robert Washington 
Rodregis Brooks nla Troy Walters California 
David Macklin Virginia Reggie Wayne Louisiana 
Idrees Bashir Georgia Marvin Harrison Pennsylvania 
Joseph Jefferson Kentucky Chad Bratzke Carmel,IN 
Shyrone Smith nla Dwight Freeney Connecticut 
Clifton Crosby Maryland Rob Morris Indianapolis, IN 
Edgerrin James Florida David Pugh Virginia 
Jason Doering Wisconsin Josh Williams Indianapolis, IN 
Ricky Williams Texas James Cannida Florida 
Jim Finn New Jersey Saw Sword Washington D.C. 
Detron Smith Colorado Brad Scioli Pennsylvania 
Brian Leigeb Michigan Joe Walker Texas 
Cory Bird New Jersey Jerrnaine Hampton Illinois 
r' Mike Roberg nla David Gibson Florida 
Justin Snow Texas Chukie Noworkie Indianapolis, IN 
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David Thornton North Carolina Greg Favors Georgia 
Mike Peterson Florida Marcus Washington Alabama 
Donnel Thompson Wisconsin Rob Murphy Ohio 
Jeff Saturday Indianapolis, IN Rick Demulling Washington 
Ryan Diem Indianapolis, IN Josh Mallard Georgia 
Aaron Meadows Carmel, IN Waverly Jackson Virginia 
(www.colts.com. 2002) 
Of the 58 players on the Colts' roster only 10 live in Indianapolis, and only two more live 
in the metro area. Therefore, Indianapolis taxpayers are spending millions of dollars on 
this team, and only 17% of them are living and spending money in the city. After 
knowing this, taxpayers should think long and hard before spending anymore of their 
money to support these millionaire ballplayers who only spend enough time here to 
collect their paycheck. 
When it comes to sports stadiums, the justification that they help support 
economic development is just hard to swallow. The net effect on the city is barely even 
noticeable. With the existence of a sports team new money is not entering the area. 
Instead, money is just being allocated to other areas. For example, during the baseball 
work strike of 1994, Hollywood had its best September ever (Baade and Sanderson, 
1997). Therefore, before we justity economic development, just think about the local 
people in your community who own movie theaters, roller rinks, and restaurants. When 
you are spending money at the Colts game you are investing in individuals who take that 
money and spend it elsewhere, while local people who live in your community are 
suffering. 
Another strike against the claim that stadiums bolster economic development is a 
study done by Robert Baade, a professor at Lake Forest College. Baade's study 
examined the effects sports stadiums had on metropolitan areas. For his study, he 
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examined thirty different metropolitan areas. The results of his study discovered that 
twenty-seven of the thirty metro areas he examined had little or no change in per capita 
growth. The other three areas, St. Louis, San Francisco, and Washington D.C., actually 
experienced a negative impact in per capita growth (www.bizjournals.comlhoustonl. 
1996). 
Downtown Development 
Politicians and team officials also like to promote the effects stadiums can have 
on downtown development. They believe that stadiums will help revitalize downtown, 
and generate more economic and social activity in these decaying areas. In fact, many 
cities have built downtown stadiums and have transformed these areas into revitalized 
cultural and economic meccas. Their main intention is to reverse the trend of a growing 
suburbia. However, the results of twelve areas that have downtown facilities are not 
strong enough to justify the stadiums' construction. While all of these areas did have 
private sector job growth, they also had expanding populations. Cities with downtown 
facilities saw a job increase of 19.3%, while cities without a downtown sport facility saw 
a job growth rate of 19.9%. Population growth of cities with downtown facilities was 
5.9%, and cities without downtown facilities were 5.2%. While these numbers do 
indicate some impact, they do not present overwhelming evidence that stadiums justifY 
their costs (Rosentraub, 1997). 
Government Assistance 
The conclusion regarding stadiums and their finance's is stadiums do not pay for 
themselves, but continue to be built at an alarming rate. The question then must be 
asked, how is this happening? The answer is: subsidies, taxes and leverage. Subsidies 
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and taxes are what cities across the nation continue to use in order to finance these sports 
palaces. Leverage is what teams have due to the monopoly the four main sports leagues 
enjoy in our country. The root of the problem is that every city wants a major league 
team, and there are many areas around our country that could support a major league 
franchise. Since there is an excess amount of communities that could support a team, 
these communities have to separate themselves from the pack by offering "sweet" deals 
that include lavish stadiums with plenty of extra amenities that make them appealing to 
franchises. The only problem is that sports teams do not generate enough revenue to 
cover the costs of these stadiums, and do to the current economic condition of our 
country we cannot afford to waste valuable resources on stadiums. 
Currently in our country there is a persistent push to cut federal costs. This 
attention and concern with our national budget has led to the elimination of numerous 
social and economic programs. In fact, just the other day in his State of the State 
Address, Governor Frank O'Bannon announced cuts in the state's university budget that 
were in the range of $40 million ("No new funds on table for BSU", 2003). While we 
are continuously cutting funding to programs like education and welfare, there is still one 
area that is thriving due to the support they get from the government: professional sports 
(www.bizjournals.com/houston/.1996).Yes.that·sright. while the rest of America 
suffers because of the economic crisis we are now enduring, the millionaires employed 
by the sports industry are thriving. 
When discussing the battle for subsidies between education and sports it is 
important to look at revenue generation. While the common belief would be that 
professional sports teams generate more revenue, in actuality that couldn't be any farther 
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from the truth. In fact, total undergraduate tuition at a good private university with six 
thousand or more undergraduates exceeded the revenues of any professional sports team. 
In addition, in 1994 the top ten universities for federal research grants received more 
grant money than the combined revenues from Major League Baseball and the National 
Basketball Association (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). 
Currently, the United States is experiencing a boom in the construction of new 
sports stadiums. Industry experts estimate that more than $7 billion will be spent on new 
stadium construction before 2006 (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). And theses stadiums are 
being financed by increased government subsidies. Since 1989, federal subsidies for 
sports stadiums have quadrupled. Subsidies now account for over 65% of the cost of a 
stadium that is estimated to cost over $200 million (www.bizjournals.comlhoustonl. 
1996). In fact of the forty-five new stadiums that were built in the 1990s, $4 out of every 
$5 spent on stadiums came from public sources. Only 5 of the existing 49 football and 
baseball stadiums were built with private money (www.privatization.org). 
Benefits of Stadiums 
With all of the negatives associated with stadiums how do politicians continue to 
convince us to build them. They talk about being a "major league" city, neighborhood 
revitalization and imported revenue. And to some extent politicians are right. Stadiums 
do provide the population with some benefits. The question, though, is do the benefits 
outweigh the negatives. 
Revitalization or development is one concept that is commonly used. 
Government agencies across the nation have tried to sell us on the concept of using 
stadiums to spur development. In most cases, stadiums are used to reverse the effects of 
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suburbia. Government leaders have long used stadiums to keep central business districts 
integral to their region's economic and social life. Stadiums are used to emphasize urban 
life, and create interest in living and working downtown (Rosentraub, 1997). 
One city that has been a champion of this movement is our own Indianapolis. 
Concerned about our image, or lack thereof, city officials used a sports stadium as their 
crown jewel in a larger development project to revitalize and create an identity for 
Indianapolis. Indianapolis is one of the few cities, if not the only one, that was able to 
successfully use a stadium to spur development. The reason this occurred was because 
the city used the stadium as part of a plan. Instead of being held hostage by a team, and 
forced into action, city leaders were allowed to plan and strategize and ultimately come 
up with a solution. Indianapolis's plan was to become a sports capital, and use this 
I"'" institution to draw people to the city from outside areas. 
By drawing people from other areas we were truly benefiting the economy. 
Instead of displacing money from another area, we were introducing currency that would 
not have otherwise entered our economy (Rosentraub, 1997). This concept must be taken 
into account when considering a new "football-only" stadium. We must determine if this 
new stadium will bring in more events, or if it will merely keep the same events we 
already have. 
Economic development and drawing people into the city was touched on 
previously. However, the simple fact about stadiums is that they are used for two 
purposes. Stadiums are used to attract the city's own residents or to bring in tourists. 
Officials believe these large crowds will encourage investments in related entertainment 
facilities such as restaurants, bars and retail outlets (Rosentraub, 1997). 
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"The Politician's Theory" 
Stadium => Restaurants => Mall => Offices => Housing 
However, there are two huge problems with this theory. The first is displacement. 
By attracting current residents you are merely displacing economic activity, which 
negates the stadiums' effect. Secondly, how can politicians justify out of town visitors 
are attracted to the city just because of the stadium. Unfortunately, we do not poll these 
individuals. Therefore, we do not know how many come to the city, how much this 
segment spends, and if sports is their only reason for visiting the city. 
The next benefit of having a stadium is the one that is most popular among 
stadium proponents. This benefit is the ability to consider their city a "major league" 
city. Having a professional sports team automatically signifies that a certain area is a 
"major league" city. Never mind population size, economic impact, or any other variable 
a sports team is what earns a city the right to be considered a "major league" city. 
This benefit is directly associated to the public consumption benefits that are 
provided by stadiums. This benefit is the satisfaction that people get from living in a city 
with this stature. These individuals benefit from having another topic of conversation 
that is common to most citizens, and from reading about the team's successes and failures 
in the newspaper. Politicians like to promote this feature because it has the potential to 
be large in the aggregate because no citizen can be excluded from consumption and one 
citizen's consumption does not reduce the consumption available to every one else 
(Zimmerman, 1997). 
The public consumption benefit goes hand in hand with another benefit called 
,/""' "externality." Externality is the benefit realized by those individuals who do not go to the 
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game or watch it on television. However, these individuals derive a benefit because they 
enjoy having a team, and following them through the news. The press derives a 
considerable benefit from the amount of revenue they receive from covering sports 
events. Therefore, because of externality people are in favor of subsidizing even if they 
do not go to the games (Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). 
This is an interesting concept and one that should be considered when deciding 
how to finance' stadiums. Since many groups are in favor of taxing those who benefit 
from the team and stadium, why not tax the media? These individuals probably derive 
considerable amounts of revenue from advertising. I would venture to guess that this 
incremental inc:ome would probably be far superior to restaurant and bar revenues. 
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Indianapolis and the Colts 
"Do We Continue To Pay?" 
"What are the Colts Worth?" 
"It's problematic because they play so i'!frequently and employ so few 
people. The right debate in Indy is how much is it worth to you just to 
have the team." -(" What are the Colts Worth? ", 2002) 
The story of the Colts and Indianapolis does not begin in 1984 with the arrival of the 
infamous Mayflower moving vans. In contrast to most stadium construction projects this 
mamage was well planned and the movement began III the mid-70s. 
The story of Indianapolis and the Colts began with the "Indiana-No-Place" 
movement and the Sports and Downtown Development Strategy. In the 1970s, 
Indianapolis like other Rust Belt communities was beginning to decline. The city had a 
declining job base, deteriorating downtown core, and occupied a small place in the 
national and international economic landscape. Above all else, the city had no image. 
Favorite son Kurt Vonnegut commented on the city by calling it a "cemetery with lights 
that came to life one day a year for the Indy 500." (Rosentraub, 1997) 
While citizens' criticism was sharp, the numbers weren't much better. From 
1970-1980 the consolidated city of Indianapolis lost 4.5% of its population, and now 
accounted for only 54.5% of the metro area's population (Rosentraub, 1997). What is 
even worse is the economic growth that the city experienced during this time. While the 
rest of the Midwest grew at a rate of 19.7%, Indianapolis lagged behind at 16.7% 
(Rosentraub,1997). 
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These trends led to the creation of Indianapolis's new strategy to be a sports 
capital. City leaders developed an initiative that would serve two objectives. The first 
would be to establish a market niche for Indianapolis in amateur sports. The second 
objective would be to use this strategy to redevelop the downtown core as the cultural 
and economic center ofthe city and region (Rosentraub,1997). 
The central component of this strategy was to establish several facilities that 
would become the new anchors for the revitalized downtown. The first thing the city did 
was build Market Square Arena in 1974. The 16,950-seat venue was paid for by the city 
through the Department of Public Works. The city then constructed other venues: the 
Sports Center, the Indiana University Track and Field Stadium, the Indiana University 
Natatorium, the Veiodrome, the National Institute of Sports, and the Hoosier Dome 
(p.194). The last piece of the sports puzzle was the Hoosier Dome. The Hoosier Dome 
cost $78 million, $48 million from the public sector through a I % tax on food and 
beverage, and a $30 million from a local foundation. (Rosentraub,1997) 
With the completion of the dome, the city had created an image for itself and was 
now established as a sports city. The next step in the process was to invigorate the 
economy. To do this the city started the Economic Development Center to assist 
companies that might want to move or expand operations in Indianapolis 
(Rosentraub,1997). 
List of Development Projects 
Project Year Cost (millions 
Market Square Arena 1974 $16 
Sports Center 1979 $7 
IU Track & Field Stadium 1982 $5.9 
IU Natatorium 1982 $21.5 
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.- Project Year Cost (millions) 
Velodrome 1982 $2.68 
Hoosier Dome 1984 $78 
National Institute of Sports 1988 $9 
Children's Museum 1976 $25 
Indiana Theater 1980 $6 
Walker Building 1985 $3.4 
Zoo 1988 $37.5 
Eiteljorg Museum 1989 $60 
Hyatt HotellBank 1977 $55 
Embassy Suites Hotel 1985 $31.5 
Westin Hotel 1989 $65.5 
City Market 1986 $4.7 
Lockerbie Market 1986 $15.8 
Union Station 1986 $53.3 I 
Circle Centre Mall 1995 $300 
Capitol Tunnel 1982 $1.4 
Heliport 1985 $5.58 
Pan Am Plaza 1987 $35.2 
2 W. Washington offices 1982 $13 
IN. Capitol offices 1982 $13.61 
Farm Bureau offices 1992 $36 
State Office Center 1992 $264 
Lilly Corporate expansion 1992 $242 
Lower Canal Apartments 1985 $20.2 
Lockfield Apartments 1987 $25.22 
Canal Overlook Apartments 1988 $11 
Indiana University 1990 $231 
(Rosentraub, 194, 1997) 
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Was it Succesful? 
By all accounts, Indianapolis's "Sports and Downtown Development Strategy" 
was a success. Unlike other areas of the country, our city's effort was more successful 
than any other area's facility-oriented effort. While central business district (CBD) job 
loss was 27.7% in other cities, Indianapolis's losses only amounted to 17.8% 
(Rosentraub, 1997). 
Along with doing better on job loss, we also fared better on popUlation loss. 
Indianapolis's decline in centrality was better than any other area. While most cities 
CBD population declined by 10%, Indianapolis declined by 5.9% and the overall metro 
area grew by 62% (Rosentraub, 1997). While some might argue the success of this 
initiative, I believe you have to look at the silver lining. Suburbanization is something 
that is going to occur regardless of what we try. Stopping it is not the battle, slowing it 
down is. 
While the prevIOUS numbers are encouragmg, to truly judge the success of 
Indianapolis's revitalization you have to examine three factors: 
I. Size of residential population downtown 
II. Concenlration of jobs in central business district 
111. Type of firms attracted downtown. 
The first two questions have already been answered. The third can be answered 
by first looking at the Westside of Downtown. Due to investments in sports and other 
areas, the State of Indiana and Indiana University both made substantial investments in 
Downtown. If these two groups had not believed in the initiative the number of high-
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paying jobs and the complexion of the area would be drastically altered 
(Rosentraub,1997). 
Further, Indianapolis has benefited because of the numerous events we host, the 
new business buildings we have constructed, the museums and theaters, and apartment 
projects we have initiated. All of this can be traced back to the sports initiative 
(Rosentraub,1997) 
"I think we know that our reputation, our ability to recruit new employees, all of 
those have to do with the types of amenities our city offers. The Colts, the 
Children's Museum. the zoo, the Convention Center and the symphony combine to 
make Indianapolis a more attractive place to live. " 
-Tamara Zahn, President of Downtown Indianapolis Inc 
Pre-Negotiation 
Congratulations residents of Indianapolis! Together you and your elected 
officials built a strategy that involved a sports stadium and were successful. Now, before 
we move forward and discuss the studies and reports being aired about the current 
situation, lets take a quick look at the events that have occurred in another city. Keep 
these lessons in mind. You were successful once hopefully you can be successful again. 
The Queen City of Cincinnati was subjected to a problem similar to the one 
Indianapolis had faced twenty years earlier. According to one individual associated with 
the process, "It was about image. In a county desperately afraid of being perceived as 
another Louisville, Lexington, Dayton, or Columbus, voters have bought a lot of 
image ... at a pretty high price." (Blair and Swindell, 321, 1997) 
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Cincinnati's story is a ten-year battle that was waged between the city and their 
two teams, the Bengals and the Reds. The city desperately wanted to keep both teams 
and preserve their image. The Bengals and Reds wanted new stadiums and the financial 
spoils that accompanied them. What pursued was a battle that entailed large financial 
and political costs that few could have ever imagined ("Cincinnati's sports plan to cost $2 
billion", 2002). 
Initially, the first proposal was to renovate Cinergy Field and build a companion 
venue for one of the teams at a cost of $181 million. From these humble beginnings, the 
city was forced into building two new stadiums: one for football and one for baseball 
("Cincinnati's sports plan to cost $2 billion", 2002). What ensued was franchise free 
agency where a team could leverage its position by threatening to leave town. This 
occurs because of the non-competitive structure of the U.S. team sports industry. The 
leagues maximize the profits of their members by keeping the number of franchises 
below the number of cities that are economically viable locations for a team. As a result, 
cities are thrust into competition with one another to procure or retain teams. The form 
this competition takes is a bidding war, whereby cities bid their willingness to pay to 
have a team, not the minimum amount that would be necessary to keep a team viable 
(Noll and Zimbalist, 1997). 
When this occurred in Cincinnati, the city was left with two stadiums and a bill 
for $2 billion. This is the cost they incurred for the construction of the Bengals' Paul 
Brown Stadium, and the Reds' Great American Ball Park. Voters in the city 
overwhelmingly approved a half-cent sales tax to pay for the stadiums, and then turned 
on the local politician most closely identified with the stadium initiatives. In 2000, Bob 
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Bedinghaus became the first Republican in thirty-six years to lose an election for the 
three-person Hamilton County Board ("Cincinnati's sports plan to cost $2 billion", 2002). 
Once again, if there is a silver lining to this event it is that we can learn from 
Cincinnati's mistake. Instead of listening to the reports and experts, remember what we 
wanted to get out of this initiative in the first place: an image and economic development. 
Now that we have both do we really need and NFL team if it's going to cost us between 
$500 million and $1 billion? 
The Current Battle 
The affair between the Colts and the city has always been about money. In the 
following paragraphs we will discuss the millions that the city gives the Colts to keep 
them in the city. We will hear how the RCA Dome and its features prevent the Colts 
from making money and being competitive in the league. The problem, though, is not the 
lack of talent on the field or lack of luxury boxes in the stands. The problem is that 
Indiana is a basketball state, and when you get right down to it Hoosiers will always be 
Pacer fans first, and Colts fans second. 
From 1984 to 1995 the Indianapolis Colts played in the Hoosier Dome and the 
city helped support them by annually paying the team $250,000. For eleven years these 
payments summed up to be $2.75 million. Unfortunately, this trend has changed. In the 
past eight years., the Capital Improvements Board has given the team $89 million. Of this 
sum, $23.8 million came in the form of luxury suite improvements and the rest was cash 
payments. Now the city pays the Colts about $12 million a year in funding, including all 
luxury suite revenue, and an additional $1.2 million to offset game-day expenses ("What 
are the Colts worth?", 2002). 
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To help finance these payments the city has done what else: raise taxes. As 
opposed to an area-wide tax, the city has assessed various taxes in order to avoid the 
inequity of taxing those who do not benefit from the team's existence. The first tax is a 
6% Marion County hotel-motel tax. Other taxes include a 1% tax on restaurants, a 2% 
tax on car and truck rentals, and a 5% tax on tickets to Colts, Pacers and Indians games 
("What are the Colts worth?", 2002). Together these taxes generate a significant amount 
of revenue for Marion County. The hotel and restaurant taxes alone generated $33.3 
million last year ("What are the Colts worth?", 2002). 
Since the taxpayer is paying these astronomical amounts it is important to learn 
what this money is going towards. A special report by the Indianapolis Star uncovered 
the money trail. According to their report about one-third of the money covered costs for 
Dome security. The majority of the remaining money went towards covering the salaries 
of ticket sellers and concierges ("Public foots bill for dome luxuries", 2002). However, 
with the remaining money there were some interesting expenses. A catering expense for 
the locker rooms, press boxes, and selected suites totaled $168,088. Then close to 
$150,000 was spent on amenities for parties at Pan Am Plaza, game related entertainment 
such as mascots and halftime shows, and then for music licensing fees and personal 
appearances by former players (Public foots bill for dome luxuries", 2002). These are all 
interesting points to keep in mind considering the Colts play in a rent-free facility, are 
given an annual subsidy to remain "competitive," and also have their game-day expenses 
covered by the city. In return, taxpayers and fans are allowed to watch, as we continually 
get humiliated on the field. 
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Why is this injustice occurring? According to the Colts they cannot generate 
enough revenue to remain competitive. This may be true. The Colts ranked last in their 
four-team division in suite and club seat revenues. While the Colts bring in about $13.4 
million annually, the expansion Texans earned around $42.4 million, the Titans $31.6 
million, and the Jaguars $27.5 million ("City slams report about Colts leaving", 2002). 
However, there is still no reason to cry for the Colts. According to one expert it is almost 
impossible to lose money in the league because seventy percent of revenue is shared 
among teams ("Expert: Colts' claim is suspect", 2002). This means that the billions 
generated from licensing and television contracts is distributed among teams so that they 
can all compete. However, this issue then pushes us into the debate of shared and 
unshared revenue, and how this is supposedly what sets teams apart. 
According to NFL revenue expert Marc Ganis, local revenue (un-shared) 
averaged about $50 million per team last year, and the Colts are probably what brought 
this number down, only generating between $35 and $43 million. This number would 
rank the team in the bottom fourth of the league ("Colts' cost may pass $10 million", 
2002). Before we start crying for the Colts the question must be asked: what do they 
need the money for. They generate about $40 million, have no expenses, get $12 million 
annually from the city, and then get their piece of the shared revenue pie. This has to be 
plenty to pay their salaries. OK, so maybe the team needs money for development and 
scouting? No, that is not the case. According to Irsay, he has spent $115 million of his 
own cash on building what he believes is the largest scouting department (and most 
overrated) in the NFL. In addition, he has also infused money into marketing ("Tough 
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Indianapolis market could land Colts in LA", 2002). Unfortunately, neither investment 
has provided a substantial return. 
For argument's sake lets assume that the Colts still need money, even though we 
have already pointed out how much they bring in and how much they have to payout in 
expenses. The question now is whether or not the team is a good investment. According 
to a study done on Indianapolis, the franchise generated about $41 million in new 
revenues and added 1,130 full and part-time jobs ("What are the Colts worth?", 2002). 
OK, now the equation looks like this: $41 million + jobs> $12 million + game-day 
expenses (this equation of course does not account for opportunity costs of using Colts' 
funds elsewhere). Hold on, though, according to Clemson economist David Swindell 
there are some major flaws in this theory. While player salaries average more than $1 
million, the other 1,130 jobs are low-wage service jobs. What's even worse is that they 
are not new jobs ("What are the Colts worth?", 2002). Like we previously mentioned 
these are the same workers who staffed area restaurants and theaters. When they were 
laid off at their other jobs, because people stopped going there in favor of stadiums, they 
were forced to move. Once again, this is not new money it's redirected money. 
We have now illustrated the fact that the Colts are not profitable, and that an 
investment in them does not offset their subsidy. So what's next? The city could build a 
new stadium and generate money off of luxury suites. In theory, this is a good idea. The 
Colts would still receive shared revenue, plus they would increase their amount of 
unshared revenue. Of course, they could probably cover their yearly expenses, but this 
would still not be enough to cover land acquisition, interest on long-term bonds, and 
operational expenses to operate the new stadium after the Colts inevitably leave town. 
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However, there is one major problem we must look at before even examining the fact that 
the Colts cannot support the long-tenn financial implications. Fan interest indicates that 
the team could probably not sell all the suites! Fortunately, Commissioner Paul 
Tagliabue has offered the citizen's of Indianapolis three strategies for prevailing in this 
market. 
Tagliabue suggested: 1. Make the games attractive as daylong instead of three-
hour outings, 2. Regionalize the fan base, and 3. Work with a broad base of businesses on 
marketing and promotions ("NFL chief tackles Colts' fate", 2002). Once again, these are 
all good ideas in theory. The problem with an all-day event is that any furor and passion 
you build up outside will quickly evaporate as you enter the cozy RCA Dome and settle 
down next to a couple of business "schmoozers." Next, would be to regionalize the fan 
base. This would be a great idea, since one of the best ways to justify a stadium is to 
claim that it attracts money from outside the region. Unfortunately, Kokomo, Marion, 
Muncie, New Castle and Bloomington are all areas that have seen better days 
economically. What is worse is that they are all passionate basketball communities. 
Evansville? Louisville? Still too far away, and neither city would embrace the Colts as 
theirs. Finally, we can work with local businesses. I apologize Mr. Tagliabue, but when 
you were in town visiting the Economic Club of Indianapolis, you must have failed to 
look at the skyline of our city. Indianapolis is dominated by regional banks that are not 
even headquartered in Indianapolis, and the fact is we are just not a large corporate town. 
Plus, there is a certain curse in Indianapolis of putting your name on any of our sporting 
facilities. 
xxxi 
The Financing of Sports Arenas: 
The games played off the field 
Now the question becomes: are we willing to pay for the Colts? They lose 
money, lose games, and haven't proven they can spur economic development. However, 
they do help our city's image. The question then becomes: will taxpayers support our 
"poor" millionaires. The answer is an emphatic NO. In a poll conducted by WTHR, 
sixty-seven percent of respondents indicated they opposed making payments in order to 
keep the Colts from leaving ("Colts' cost may pass $10 million", 2002). An earlier poll 
indicated that seventy-one percent opposed public financing to build a new stadium, and 
what's even worse only sixteen percent called the Colts the area's top franchise ("Most 
oppose using taxes to help Colts", 2002). To me it sounds as if Mayflower better be 
ready for another call. 
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Survey 
As a part of my research, I decided to conduct a survey of Indianapolis business 
people. I believed the survey was necessary in order to determine the impact the Colts, 
the RCA Dome, and downtown events have on area businesses. The main reason to 
conduct the survey was to establish my theory that the Colts do not have an impact on our 
economy, and that the true driver of our economy is conventions and other events. This 
was important because many local leaders are trying to sway citizens by telling them that 
the loss of the Colts' will have a significant impact on the city. 
This survey was conducted within close proximity to the RCA Dome. The area 
that these 50 surveys were administered is bordered by Pennsylvania St. to the east, the 
railroad track to the south, West St. to the west, and Washington St. to the north. 
Survey Results 
The intent of this survey was to validate the fact that Indianapolis's downtown 
development project was a success, and that the RCA Dome and its events were 
responsible for the city's growth, not the Colts. The survey asked various questions such 
as would your business be here if not for the RCA Dome, which events have the biggest 
impact on your business, what would you like to see the city do in terms of whether or 
not to keep the Colts, would your business agree to tax increases to keep the Colts, and 
what would happen to your employees if your business closed. 
Below are some selected questions, and the results. A complete list of survey 
questions and results is located in the Appendix. 
1. Would you have located in the present location if the RCA Dome were not 
here? 
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Seventy percent of respondents believed they would have located here even if the 
RCA Dome had not been built. Twenty-percent believed they would not have located in 
their present lo(;ation if not for the RCA Dome. What has possibly skewed these results 
is the fact that many businesses came after the mall's construction. Therefore, we asked 
question #5. 
5. In your opinion, would the mall have been built if not for the RCA Dome and 
its multitude of events? 
Sixty-two percent of our respondents believed the mall would not have been built 
if not for the dome. Therefore, nearly every business can directly trace its existence to 
the dome. Either the dome itself, or the mall, which is a result of the dome, has led the 
majority of these businesses to downtown. This further proves that our sports 
development program has been very successful. 
6. Would you be in favor oflosing the Colts, if that meant we had more events, 
games and conventions, at the RCA Dome that brought visitors in front out 
of town? 
In response to this question, 34% of the managers/owners of downtown 
businesses indicated they would be in favor of losing the Colts. This is an important 
concept, because this question truly gets to the heart of the economic benefit theory. If 
Indianapolis is solely concerned with economic benefit than we will lose the Colts and 
pursue other events that bring "new" money into the area, and 34% of respondents 
realized this. 
7.& 9. Questions 7 & 9 Deal with whether or not businesspeople believe we 
should make payments to the Colts in the form of subsidies, or whether we 
should adopt a tax increase to support the Colts. These questions were asked 
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in order to show the disparity between those who wanted the Colts, and then 
how many would actually pay to support them. 
In response to the city making payments to the Colts, 60% of respondents 
indicated they were not in favor of the city making annual payments to the Colts. As for 
a tax increase, 68% percent were against a tax increase. While people are quick to jump 
on the bandwagon to keep the Colts, when it comes right down to it very few are willing 
to put there money where their mouth is. It is important to make note of this, because in 
order for the city to keep the Colts one of these two things must happen. Therefore, we 
need to assess the public's interest in these occurrences. These results indicate that we 
should not pursue either, and for the Mayor the backlash is apparent ifhe considers either 
of these moves. 
7. Would you be in favor of a football-only facility for the Colts, even if that 
meant the loss of other events such as games and conventions? 
This question was asked to uncover whether or not the city such pursue a plan of 
action that could potentially allow the Colts to support themselves, and could also lead to 
the loss of other events and revenue streams. Since the only way the Colts can improve 
their earning power is to build a new stadium, we needed to ask businesspeople how they 
would feel about this if it meant losing conventions and other events. Survey results 
indicated that 88% of the respondents were against a football-only facility. 
When you consider this result with the results concerning whether or not 
Indianapolis should use tax revenues, the likelihood of keeping the Colts becomes a lot 
cloudier. However, without a stadium that has extra-revenue generators, or subsidies 
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from the government there are very few ways to generate additional revenue. The Colts 
only other option is to increase marketing and hope to expand their fan base. 
It also should be noted that while a stadium would increase the revenue of the 
team, it will not help the city, which will have to support construction, and financing 
costs, as well as the opportunity costs of the land. 
10. For your business's interest, what would you like to see the city do? 
This question gave the power back to the people. Since business development 
and economic impact are two components that politicians like to promote when 
discussing the benefits of stadiums, why not determine what really would be the best use 
of funds. Therefore, the best way to arrive at this conclusion is to ask the very people 
that would be affected by these actions: the downtown businesspeople. 
The survey asked these individuals which of the following circumstances would 
have the biggest impact on their business: 
• Keeping the Colts 
• Indianapolis hosting the Super Bowl 
• Indianapolis hosting an NCAA Bowl Game 
• Continuing to attract the NCAA Basketball Championships 
• Staying committed to amateur sports and attempt to attract the Olympics or other 
multi-day events 
• Attract more conventions to the Convention Center 
In regards to keeping the Colts 14% of respondents indicated this was their first 
choice, and 36% of respondents indicated this would be their last priority. As for 
attracting the Super Bowl, this was the first choice of 12% and the sixth choice of20%. 
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An NCAA Bowl Game was the first choice for 10% and the sixth choice for 20%. 
Continuing to attract the NCAA Basketball Championships was the first choice for 14% 
and the sixth choice for 8%. Staying committed to amateur sports and multi -day events 
was the number one choice among 24% of respondents and the sixth choice among 16%. 
As for conventions, this was the number one choice among 56% and the number six 
choice among 2%. 
From these results it is obvious that conventions have the greatest impact on 
businesses. Conventions have a higher frequency of occurrence, are multi-day events, 
attract clientele that have a large amount of discretionary income, and bring people into 
the city from outside the area. Unlike fans for athletic events, they are here for multiple 
days and since they stay downtown are forced to support our local economy. 
11. & 12. IfIndianapolis discontinued having events at the RCA Dome what 
would happen to your company, and if your business closed what would 
happen to your employees? 
These questions are also important, because they deal with economic issues. 
Specifically, if the loss of the Colts would mean the closing of their operations, and 
whether they believe their workers would become unemployed, or would be able to find 
employment in Indianapolis. These questions are important because the loss of jobs and 
impending unemployment of workers, would merit the need for the stadium to support 
the Indianapolis economy. 
However, survey results indicated that only 4% thought discontinuing events at 
the RCA Dome would cause them to cease operations. Other businesses indicated they 
would either market more actively, move to other parts of the city, or depend solely on 
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traffic from the mall, conventions and Pacers. As for finding new employment, 70% 
believed their employees would find new employment in Indianapolis. Once again, these 
results indicated that there would be a minimal amount of adverse impact on the city if 
the Colts left. 
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Overview 
The problem with sports stadiums is that they just cannot cover their own costs. 
Normally, if a business or group wants something they save up enough money to 
purchase it. If the item is unusually expensive they might obtain financing. This means 
they believe that this new idea or piece of equipment will not only generate enough 
income to support the operation, but it will also generate enough incremental income to 
cover it's own costs and the interest rates attached to the financing needed to make the 
purchase. Historically, this is how the American economy worked. 
Then carne professional sports. The proponents of sports stadiums like to purport 
a theory, or in actuality a lie that goes like this: 'we should build a stadium, obtain bonds 
to finance construction, not generate enough money to cover the costs, complain we 
cannot make enough money, sink further into debt, renegotiate, continue to sink further 
into debt, and then claim that we need another stadium in order to get the team out of 
debt.' That, in a tongue and cheek nutshell, is the economics of professional sports in 
America. 
Unfortunately, rational thinking has disappeared and this tragedy continues to 
occur. Why? Because in America we have three groups of people: sports fans, 
politicians, and the general public. Sports fans love their teams and will do anything to 
keep them in their native city. These people "love" their teams and we all know love is 
blind. 
Therefore, these people turn to politicians and demand that they save their team or 
risk losing the next election. The politicians do not want to risk losing the election, and 
they also don't want to be remembered for losing the city's franchise. In order to protect 
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themselves, they must convince the general public to rally around the construction of a 
new stadium. 
To do this, politicians must appeal to the persuaded. The general public is made 
up of two groups: the informed and the persuaded. The informed are those that are aware 
of what is going on, and can see through the politician's magic show. The persuaded, 
however, are those that are not willing to take the time to research what is going on and 
are therefore easily persuaded by what the politicians say. 
What the politicians are saying are fallacies. Their two main claims are that 
having a team makes a city a "major-league" town and that having a team will spur 
economic growth. First, let's discuss this theory of being a "major-league" town. In 
order to put this into a context that is easier to comprehend, being a "major-league" town 
to a city is the equivalent of being popular to a teenager. When individuals were younger 
they believed they needed a nice car or new sneakers to be accepted. Their self-esteem 
and sense of self-worth was associated to this. When this occurred parents, counselors 
and friends would tell the individual how this was not true and that they were being 
irrational. 
Well now we have cities that think they are defined by how many professional 
sports franchises they have. Unfortunately, now we do not have parents stepping in to 
tell the city how irrational this is. In taking Indianapolis as an example, someone needs 
to point out to the citizens that there is more to the city than sports. Indianapolis is home 
to one of the world's largest pharmaceutical companies, wonderful universities and 
numerous museums and cultural attractions. Obviously, Indianapolis has enough to be 
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proud of. Going back to the high school analogy, it was impractical back then to buy a 
pair of shoes for $150, and now it is impractical to pay $500 million for a sports stadium. 
The second fallacy that politicians enjoy using is the amount of economic benefit 
stadiums provide. Unfortunately, the benefits cannot be proven. Stadiums promote low-
income job opportunities, tie up resources that could be used for other projects, have huge 
opportunity costs in terms ofland, lead to increased taxes which reduce consumption, 
take business away from other sources, and do not draw new money into the local 
economy. When considering all these factors how could anyone justify that a stadium 
can help generate growth in the economy. In cities across America, we hear from 
politicians and citizens groups that attest to the impact stadiums can have on economies. 
What we never hear, however, are business's urging communities to invest in 
stadiums. If stadiums are so beneficial to the economy then why aren't we hearing from 
businesspeople? As a result of this question, I decided to help my native Indianapolis and 
ask the business community myself. What I found out was astonishing. In conducting 
surveys it was revealed that conventions and other events had a more profound impact on 
operations. In fact, when asked what the city should invest in, only a marginal amount 
believed the city should spend in order to save the Colts. Finally, there was also the fact 
that businesspeople did not believe their business would close if the Colts left, or that 
employees would have to leave Indianapolis to find new employment. With business 
leaders perceiving very little benefit from the Colts, and claiming the loss of the team 
would have very little impact on their business the theory of economic benefit gets 
weaker and weaker. 
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Simply, stadiums are not a good move economically. There is no way for 
incremental revenue from the team to offset their costs, and there is no conclusive 
evidence that the stadiums generate any benefit for the economy. 
-
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Conclusion: A Letter to Jim Irsay 
Dear Mr. Irsay, 
Good news! Fortunately, for all of us, the Indianapolis Colts can stay in 
Indianapolis, be profitable, and be competitive. Luckily, Mr. Irsay, the Indianapolis area 
is alive and growing, and our economy is rebounding. Of course, our economy would be 
doing significantly better if one of our city's most prominent business leaders didn't have 
to depend on $12.5 million in handouts to keep his operations afloat. For months you 
have been moaning about how Indianapolis cannot support a team, and how the stadium 
is not adequate. Please, Mr. Irsay you are a grown man. Please start taking responsibility 
for your operations, and instead of blaming others start being more proactive in 
contributing to your team's success. 
The first thing you should do is take a short walk across downtown and attend a 
game at Conseco Fieldhouse. Conseco Fieldhouse will give you plenty of ideas on how 
to better entertain your fans and keep your luxury boxes filled. If they can fill their 
stadium forty-one times a year (41 *15,000=615,000 tickets), then you can certainly fill 
yours eight times a year (8*56,000=448,000 tickets). Instead of being worried about why 
the Pacers are the area's favorite team, maybe you should use this asset to learn how to be 
successful in this market. 
Next Mr. Irsay you should take your beloved helicopter and go on a few trips. 
No, do not head off to Florida or the Caribbean, instead visit the exotic destinations of 
Kansas City, Green Bay and Nashville. All of these cities are supporting teams in 
markets that are much smaller than yours, and two of them in stadiums much older than 
yours. Walk around the tailgates, sit in the stands and take in the event. Consider it a 
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challenge to figure out why their fans love coming to the game. What you will probably 
notice is that, like the Pacers' fans, they love their teams. 
These tans show up early, leave late and for one afternoon a week they live and 
breathe football. They are devoted to their team, and feel as if they are all members of 
one bigger team. Now you ask: how do these teams create this magical feeling? The 
answer: they allow their fans to form an attachment to them. They don't have owners 
who continually threaten to move the team, and complain about not making money, while 
at the same time they are building helipads on their property. It's up to you Mr. Irsay. 
Quit threatening us, and allow us to embrace you team. We now know the truth. 
Stadiums do not help generate economic development, and we are no longer going to sit 
quiet while you extort funds from our city. It is time for you to do your job. We know 
,- your family is not use to staying in one place for a long time, but you might be surprised 
if you tried. 
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Honors Survey 
My name is Bill Matthias. I am currently a Senior at Ball State University, and am 
conducting a survey in order to complete my Honors Thesis: "The Financing of Sports 
Arenas." The survey I am conducting today is intended to give me a better idea of 
downtown business people's perspective on the impact of the Colts and other RCA Dome 
events have on their operations. Your answers to the following questions are greatly 
appreciated and will be kept confidential. Thank you very much. 
Name ______________________ _ 
Company 
1. Would you have located in the present location if the RCA Dome was not here? 
Yes No 
2. Do you believe the RCA Dome, has had a significant impact on downtown 
development? 
Yes No 
3. Please rank in order the amount of influence each ofthese events has on your 
business? (1 =most influence, 7 =/east influence) 
a. Circle Centre Mall 
b. Pacer Games 
c. Colts Games 
d. '1CAA Championships_ 
e. College Games 
f. High School Games 
g. Conventions 
4. The loss of which of the following would have the biggest impact on your 
business? 
a. Colts 
b. RCA Dome Events (NCAA Championships, Amateur Athletics, IU and 
Purdue Games, etc.)_ 
c. Pacers 
d. Conventions 
5. In your opinion, would the mall have been built if not for the RCA Dome and its 
multitude of events? 
Yes No 
6. Would you be in favor oflosing the Colts, if that we meant we had more events at 
the RCA Dome that brought visitors in from out of town? 
Yes No 
7. Would you be in favor ofthe City ofIndianapolis making payments to the Colts 
in order to keep them in Indianapolis? 
Yes No __ _ 
8. Would you be in favor of a football-only facility for the Colts that meant the loss 
of other events? 
Yes No 
9. Would your business agree to a tax increase in order to keep the Colts? 
Yes No 
10. For your business's interest, what would you like to see the city do? (please rank 
in order, 1 =want to see the most, 6=want to see the least) 
. __ Spend $ to keep the Colts 
. __ Spend $ to try and get the Super Bowl 
. __ Spend $ to get an NCAA football Bowl Game 
. __ Spend $ to continue to attract NCAA basketball championships 
. __ Stay committed to amateur sports and try for the Olympics and other 
multi-day events 
Attract more Conventions to the Convention Center 
11. IfIndianapolis discontinued having events at the RCA Dome would your 
company: (please choose one) 
a. . __ Market More Actively in the Suburbs 
b. . __ Move to other areas of the City 
c. . __ Cease Operations 
d. . __ Depend solely upon convention, mall and Pacer traffic 
12. In your opinion, if your business closed, would: 
a. __ Your employees find more employment in Indianapolis 
b. __ Change fields of employment and stay in Indianapolis 
c. . __ Stay in same field and leave Indianapolis 
d. __ Change fields and leave Indianapolis 
e. __ Follow this company to a new city 
Thank you for your time and consideration in answering these questions. 
Sincerely, 
Bill Matthias 
) 
Honors )ct ) 
Survey Results 
Question # 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 
Survey # Mall Pacers Colts NCAA College High School Conventions 
1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 4 1 
2 1 2 5 4 4 3 3 3 6 4 1 
3 0 3 3 4 5 2 6 7 1 4 0 
4 1 2 1 5 5 4 4 4 1 4 0 
5 1 2 7 4 5 1 6 3 2 2 1 
6 2 1 2 4 5 6 7 3 2 1 
7 0 3 1 2 2 4 4 4 1 4 0 
8 3 1 1 2 4 5 6 3 1 0 
9 1 2 4 2 3 5 6 7 1 1,4 1 
10 1 2 4 2 3 5 6 7 1 4 1 
11 2 2 6 3 5 4 7 1 4 1 
12 1 1 3 3 3 4 3 7 1 4 1 
13 1 1 4 7 7 7 7 7 1 4 1 
14 0 3 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 4 0 
15 1 3 1 5 5 2 3 5 1 4 0 
16 1 1 4 5 5 2 3 6 1 4 1 
17 0 3 1 3 3 1 1 4 2 4 1 
18 1 3 4 5 6 3 2 1 7 2 1 
19 1 2 7 5 2 3 4 6 1 4 0 
20 1 2 4 2 5 3 6 7 1 3 1 
21 1 1 5 2 4 3 6 7 1 4 1 
22 1 3 5 7 6 6 7 7 1 4 1 
23 1 3 2 4 3 5 6 7 1 4 0 
24 1 1 2 3 4 7 6 5 1 4 1 
25 1 2 2 3 4 5 5 5 1 4 1 
26 1 3 7 3 1 4 5 6 2 1 0 
1 
) 
Honors. lct 
) 
Survey Results 
Question # 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 
27 0 3 3 1 1 3 6 7 1 1,3,4 0 
28 1 3 1 2 4 5 3 7 6 1 1 
29 1 2 1 6 7 3 4 5 2 4 1 
30 0 3 4 2 3 5 6 7 1 4 0 
31 1 2 6 2 3 1 4 5 2 3 1 
32 1 2 5 1 2 4 6 7 3 4 1 
33 6 2 3 5 4 1 ~ 1 "~ 
34 0 3 5 3 4 2 6 7 1 2 0 
35 1 3 7 6 5 2 3 4 1 4 1 
36 1 3 3 5 7 7 5 3 7 1 1 
37 0 3 4 4 1 5 5 3 1 0 
38 1 3 1 1 1 1 4 2 2 1 
39 0 3 1 7 1 1 7 7 7 1 0 
40 1 3 7 5 6 2 3 4 1 2 0 
41 1 2 3 6 7 2 4 5 1 4 1 
42 1 2 5 3 2 4 6 7 1 4 0 
43 1 3 1 5 4 5 5 7 2 4 1 
44 1 2 1 5 4 3 6 7 2 4 0 
45 0 3 4 3 2 7 5 6 1 1 1 
46 0 3 1 6 3 4 5 7 2 1 0 
47 1 3 6 1 1 1 1 7 2 4 1 
48 1 2 7 7 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 
49 1 2 4 3 5 2 6 7 1 4 1 
50 1 2 2 3 5 4 6 7 1 4 0 
1=yes On questions 3&10 each variable was assessed a number between 1&7 to determine their importance. 
O=no I I 
2 
) 
Honors ~ ,Jet ) 
Survey Results 
6 7 8 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 I 11 12 
Survey # Colts Super Bowl NCAA Bowl NCAA B-ball Olympics Conventions 
1 1 0 0 0 6 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 
2 0 1 1 0 6 5 5 4 5 2 1 1 
3 0 0 0 0 6 3 6 5 6 5 4 1 
4 1 0 0 0 4 3 4 4 4 1 4 3 
5 1 0 0 0 6 5 4 3 2 1 4 1 
6 1 0 0 " 6 5 4 3 2 4 2 v 
7 0 0 0 0 3 6 6 2 6 1 4 2 
8 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 2 1 1 1 
9 0 1 0 1 2 6 5 4 1 3 4 2 
10 0 1 0 0 3 2 4 5 6 1 4 1 
11 1 1 0 3 5 6 4 2 1 1 1 
12 0 0 0 4 2 2 2 1 1 4 2 
13 0 0 0 6 6 6 6 6 1 4 1 
14 0 0 0 6 5 4 2 3 1 2 1 
15 0 0 0 1 6 1 1 1 1 4 1 
16 1 0 0 0 6 1 5 3 4 2 4 1 
17 0 0 0 0 5 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 
18 0 0 0 0 6 5 3 4 1 2 3 1 
19 0 0 0 0 3 2 5 4 6 1 4 1 
20 0 1 0 1 1 5 6 4 2 3 4 2 
21 1 0 0 0 5 6 4 3 2 1 4 1 
22 1 0 0 0 6 5 5 5 1 1 4 1 
23 0 0 0 0 3 5 4 6 2 1 4 4 
24 0 1 0 0 6 1 3 5 4 2 4 5 
25 0 0 0 0 6 2 5 5 2 1 4 1 
26 0 1 0 1 1 5 3 4 6 2 1 1 
3 
,.........., 
-" 
Honors r . vJeet 
Survey Results 
6 7 8 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 11 12 
27 0 0 1 0 4 1 3 3 1 1 2 4 
28 0 1 0 1 3 2 5 1 4 6 4 1 
29 0 0 0 0 5 6 3 2 4 1 4 1 
30 0 1 0 0 4 3 5 6 2 1 4 1 
31 1 0 0 0 6 5 4 1 3 2 4 1 
32 1 0 0 1 1 5 6 4 3 2 1 1 
33 0 0 1 1 3 2 1 4 5 4 1 
34 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1,4 1 
35 0 1 1 3 6 1 4 5 2 4 1 
36 0 1 0 1 5 6 6 6 3 5 4 1 
37 0 1 0 1 5 1 2 3 6 4 4 5 
38 0 1 0 0 4 6 3 2 5 1 4 1 
39 0 1 1 1 2 1 
40 1 1 0 1 6 3 4 5 1 2 4 5 
41 1 0 0 0 6 5 4 3 1 2 4 3 
42 0 0 0 0 6 5 4 3 2 1 4 1 
43 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 4 5 1 4 1 
44 0 1 1 1 1 6 4 2 5 3 4 3 
45 1 0 0 0 6 3 4 5 1 2 4 2 
46 0 1 0 1 1 5 6 2 3 4 4 1 
47 0 1 0 2 3 4 5 6 1 1 1 
48 0 1 0 0 6 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 
49 1 0 0 0 4 5 6 2 3 1 1 1 
50 0 0 0 0 5 3 6 4 2 1 4 1 
1=yes 
O=no 
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